WitrynaWe do not require that monitoring be either almost perfect or almost public. Hence, the present paper can be regarded as one of the first works to pro-vide affirmative answers to the possibility of implicit collusion with discounting when monitoring is truly imperfect, truly private, and truly conditionally inde-pendent.4'5 Witryna1 sty 2006 · Imperfect monitoring leads to inefficient equilibria because it allows players to maintain incorrect beliefs about the network. First, players can be sure (or nearly …
Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion
Witryna1 gru 2024 · Leadership with Imperfect Monitoring Semantic Scholar DOI: 10.1016/j.leaqua.2024.101589 Corpus ID: 245562194 Leadership with Imperfect Monitoring Gerald Eisenkopf, C. Walter Published 1 December 2024 The Leadership Quarterly View via Publisher Save to Library Create Alert Cite References SHOWING … WitrynaImperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study by Attila Ambrus and Ben Greiner. Published in volume 102, issue 7, pages 3317-32 of American Economic Review, December 2012, Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooper... daryl hall wait for me 1995
Self-Adaptation with Imperfect Monitoring in Solar Energy …
Witryna4 wrz 2006 · Abstract We present a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring, which exhibits the following paradoxical feature: the (limit) equilibrium payoff set achieves full efficiency asymptotically as the public signal becomes insensitive to the hidden actions of the players. Witrynaenvironment knowledge. Even with a perfect monitor, dy-namic adjustments may still be required to account for sys-tem changes such as ageing and damage. Therefore, what to do if the monitors are imperfect? This paper proposes an ap-proach for estimating the undetected states of imperfect mon-itors in conjunction with deep Q-learning. A new … Witryna15 wrz 2007 · A third, intermediate, treatment allows for imperfect demand information (as in Green and Porter) but perfect monitoring (as in Rotemberg and Saloner). Results indicate that for a sufficiently high discount rate, demand information seems to facilitate collusion more than monitoring, especially as subjects gain experience. daryl hammond waterbury